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NOTES
THE EXTENT TO WHICH A PLAINTIFF MUST PROCEED UPON A DEFINITE
THEORY-Despite the simplification of procedure at which modern codes and
practice acts are directed, a deserving plaintiff is frequently dismissed from court
because his lawyer chose the wrong theory in presenting an admittedly valid
claim. It may happen that the complaint framed by the attorney failed to fore-
cast what evidence the lay witnesses would present or what view of that evidence
the jury would take ; 1 again, the lawyer may have adopted a legal theory different
i. Walrath v. Hanover Fire Ins. Co., 216 N. Y. 220, iio N. E. 426 (1915). See gen-
erally, Albertsworth, The Theory of Code Pleading (1922) io CALIF. L. REV. 202.
(654)
NoTES
from that taken by the trial court ;2 finally, though he gains judgment in the lower
court, he may not have anticipated that an appellate court would differ from the
trial judge as to the theory on which the claim could be supported.3 Thus like
his common law predecessor, who won or lost according as he chose "Trespass"
or "Case", "Law" or "Equity", the modern attorney must often depend on
guesswork in the field of adjective law.
Error most frequently results from an improper choice between equitable
and legal theories. While many jurisdictions have purported to abolish the dis-
tinctions between law and equity,4 the great factual difference between the two
systems as they existed at common law has its modern counterpart in the presence
of two distinct categories in the judicial mind. Thus in New York, while the cases
are conflicting, a complaint asking equitable relief has often been held demurrable
because it appeared that the plaintiff had an adequate remedy "at law"; and that
therefore no "equitable cause of action" was stated.5 Illustrative of the same
differentiation is the case of Poth v. The Church,6 in which a plaintiff who had
sought specific performance of an agreement to lease had been awarded a judg-
ment ordering return of his deposit money when it appeared that no enforceable
contract had been made. The Appellate Division reversed the judgment and
ordered the complaint dismissed, stating that no amendment of the complaint
changing the action from one in equity to one at law could be allowed. Con-
versely, it has been held that equitable relief cannot be given on a complaint
stating a legal action for conversion.7 Confusion in the cases made the erroneous
choice of an action of ejectment peculiarly disastrous in Hahl v. Sugo, where
ihe plaintiff sought to terminate the encroachment of the defendant's building on
the plaintiff's land. The court, denying equitable relief, had given a judgment
for the plaintiff, but the sheriff reported that he could not deliver possession of
the premises. When the plaintiff then sought an equitable decree ordering the
defendant to remove the building, it was held that the question was res judicata
because of the prior judgment in ejectment.
The decisions often refer to the inherent difference between law and equity
and state that the code was not intended to abolish a distinction so fundamental."
However, it sometimes appears that where a first legislative effort was not suffi-
2. Mossessian v. Callender, McAuslan & Troup Co., 24 R. I. i68, 52 At. 8o6 (Igo).
3. Indianapolis Real Estate Board v. Willson, 187 N. E. 400 (Ind. App. 1933).
4. REv. CODE ARiz. (Struckmeyer, 1928) § 3746; CAL. CODE CIV. PRoc. (Deering, 1931)
§ 3o7; CoLo. Comtp. LAWS (1921) Code of Civ. Proc. § I; CONN. GEN. STA.T. (930) § 5436;
IDAHO CODE CIv. PROC. (932) tit. 5, § ioI; I.- REv. STAT. (Cahill, 1933) c. Ifo, §§ 159, 72;
IND. REV. STAT. (Baldwin, 1934) § i4; MINN. STAT. (Mason, 1927) § 9164; 2 MO. STAT.
ANN. (932) § 696; MONT. REV. CODE (Choate, 1921) § 9oo8; NEB. COMP. STAT. (1929) C.
20, § 201; NEv. ComP. LAWS (Hillyer, 193o) § 85oo; NEw MEx. STAT. ANN. (Gourtright,
I929) c. 105, § ioi; N. Y. Crv. PhAc. (Cahill, i93i) § 8; N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1931)
§ 399; N. D. ComP. LAWS (1913) § 7355; Oiaio CODE ANN. (Throckmorton, 1930) § 11238;
OILA. STAT. (Harlow, 1931) §4; S. C. CODE (1932) §352; S. D. Coip. LAws (1929)
§ 226o; REV. STAT. UTAH (933) tit. 104, c. I, § 2; Wis, STAT. (1931) § 260.08; WYo. REv.
STAT. (193) c. 89, § 301. Cf. GA. CODE: (Michie, 1926) § 5406; Tzx. CoxsT. ANN. (Vernon,
1927) art. 5, § 8.
5. Black v. Vanderbilt, 70 App. Div. i6, 74 N. Y. Supp. 1095 (1st Dep't i9o2) ; Consoli-
dated Tire Co. v. Firestone Tire Co., 135 App. Div. 8o5, 12o N. Y. Supp. 128 (2d Dep't i9og) ;
Standard Film Service Co. v. Alexander Film Corp., 214 App. Div. 701 (1st Dep't 1925).
Contra: Sims v. Farson, 157 App. Div. 38, 141 N. Y. Supp. 673 (3d Dep't 1913) ; cf. Gillespie
v. Montgomery & Bischoff, 93 App. Div. 403, 87 N. Y. Supp. 70i (2d Dep't 1go4).
6. 207 App. Div. 219, 201 N. Y. Supp. 776 (1st Dep't 1923).
7. McNeil v. Cobb, i86 App. Div. 177, 173 N. Y. Supp. 865 (3d Dep't i919).
8. 169 N. Y. io9, 62 N. E. 135 (i9oi) ; cf. Johnson v. Purpura, 208 App. Div. 505, 203
N. Y. Supp. 58i (3d Dep't 1924):
9. Jackson v. Strong, 222 N. Y. 149 at 154, iig N. E. 512 at 513 (1917) ; Maguire v.
Taylor, 47 Mo. 115 at 128 (i87o).
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cient, a second, directed at a specific situation, has successfully bridged the chasm.
Thus prior to the enactment of a statute covering the problem, the New York
courts had refused to give personal judgment against a debtor in an action to
foreclose a lien where it appeared that the lien was invalid," It was argued
that the foreclosur6 suit was equitable and that consequently no legal judgment
could be rendered. 1 But the enactment of a statute declaring specifically that in
such cases personal judgment should be given 12 has resulted in a uniform series
of decisions enforcing a "legal" debt in "equity". 13
A review .of the authorities in certain other code states indicates still more
firmly that the distinctions between law and equity can be effectively abolished
so as to dispense with the requirement that a plaintiff select his theory from one
field or the other at his peril. Thus in California,14 Connecticut, 5 Idaho,'
Indiana 7 Kansas,' 8 Minnesota,"8  New Mexico,20 North Carolina, 21 North
Dakota,22 Oklahoma,2 3 and Wisconsin,2 it is error to dismiss the suit if the com-
plaint states any cause of action, either legal or equitable; the court will disregard
the prayer for judgment and give such relief as the facts stated justify. For
instance, where the court has determined that the plaintiff was not entitled to
specific performance as requested, it has given judgment in damages for breach
of contract. 5 Likewise, if the facts do not permit a judgment in equity, the
complaint can be amended so as to state a basis for legal jurisdiction .2  Further-
more, it has been held in several jurisdictions that equitable and legal relief may
be requested jointly or in the alternative.27
In the so-called common law and quasi-common law states (Alabama,
Arkansas, the District of Columbia, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massa-
chusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, New Jersey, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Virginia,
2O. McDonald v. Mayor, 58 App. Div. 73, 68 N. Y. Supp. 462 (Ist Dep't igoi); cf.
Fowles v. Bentley, 135 Mo. App. 417, 115 S. W. lO9O (9o9).
ii. McDonald v. Mayor, 58 App. Div. 73 at 75, 68 N. Y. Supp. 462 at 463 (Ist Dep't
19Ol).
12. N. Y. CONsoL. LAWS (Cahill, 1930) c. 34, § 54.
13. McDonald v. Mayor, 113 App. Div. 625, 99 N. Y. Supp. I22 (Ist Dep't 29o6); Ter-
williger v. Wheeler, 81 App. Div. 46o, 8I N. Y. Supp. 173 (4th Dep't 1903); Hawkins v.
Mapes-Reeves Const. Co., 82 App. Div. 72, 81 N. Y. Supp. 794 (Ist Dep't 19o3) ; cf. Varnes
v. Schwartz, 5o N. D. 511, I97 N. W. 229 (1924). On differing fact situations, the New
York courts have recently taken a more liberal view. Port v. Holzinger, 212 App. Div. 124,
208 N. Y. Supp. 287 (2d Dep't 1925) ; Westergren v. Everett, 218 App. Div. 172, 218 N. Y.
Supp. 68 (1st Dep't 1926) ; Bloom v. Gelb, 227 App. Div. 619 (2d Dep't 1929).
14. Zellner v. .Wassman, 184 Cal. So, 193 Pac. 84 (1920).
15. See Beach v. Beach Hotel Corp., H17 Conn. 445, 452, 168 Atl. 785, 788 (1933).
I6. Cassady v. Scott, 40 Idaho 137, 237 Pac. 45 (2924).
17. See Bonnell v. Allen, 53 Ind. 130, 133 (876).
18. Farney v. Hauser, iog Kan. 75, i98 Pac. 178 (1921).
19. Mannheimer v. Phinney, 167 Minn. 279, 209 N. W. 7 (1926).
20. Kingston v. Walters, 14 N. M. 368, 93 Pac. 700 (1908).
21. Virginia Trust Co. v. Webb, 206 N. C. 247, 173 S. E. 598 (1934).
22. Varnes v. Schwartz, 5o N. D. 511, 197 N. W. 129 (1924).
23. West v. Madansky, 8o Okla. 161, 194 Pac. 439 (1929).
24. Leofiard v. Rogan, 20 Wis. 540 (1866). See also TENN. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1932)
§ 10329; Morgan v. Lane, 165 Tenn. 513, 56 S. W. (2d) I61 (933).
25. Barlow v. Scott, 21 N. Y. 40 (1861) ; Virginia Trust Co. v. Vrebb, 2o6-N. C. -247,-173-
S. E. 598 (I934).
26. Sintzel v. Wagner, I19 Cal. App. 335, 6 P. (2d) 293 (193I) ; Hoehne Ditch Co. v.
Flood Ditch Co., 76 Colo. 500, 233 Pac. 167 (I925) ; Richards v. Goldstein, 124 Neb. 438, 246
N. W. 925 (I933) ; cf. Burr v. Policy Holders Life Ins. Assn., 128 Cal. App. 563, 17 P. (2d)
1024 (1933) ; Adams & Sullivan v. Boyd, 332 Mo. 484, 58 S. W. (2d) 704 (2933).
27. Pascoe v. Morrison, 219 Cal. 54, 25 P. (2d) 9 (I933) ; Perlman v. East Annadale
Beach Corp., 233 App. Div. 599, 253 N. Y. Supp. 775 (2d Dep't i93I) ; West v. Madansky,
So Okla. i6i, 194 Pac. 439 (920).
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Vermont and West Virginia)28 and in the federal courts, 20 the same court has
both equitable and legal jurisdiction as a rule, but is divided into a law side and
an equity side. There, while the plaintiff must accurately anticipate what theory
he can support at trial if his case is to proceed smoothly,30 a misconception as to
form of remedy will not ordinarily result in dismissal of his suit but merely in
a transfer of his action to the proper side of the court. As to whether dismissal
is reversible error there is a difference of opinion.31 On the other hand, the
courts are generally in accord in upholding the opposite type of action; thus
where the trial court has reached at law the conclusion that should have been
reached in equity, the judgment will be sustained, providing no motion for trans-
fer has been made by the defendant.32
Summarizing then, in approximately half of the jurisdictions 3 a lawyer
must accurately decide whether his remedy is in equity or in law at the time he
frames his complaint. This state of the law is in a large measure explained by
the difference in forms of trial required by equitable and legal issues. Nearly
all constitutions 84 provide that the right to trial by jury shall forever remain
inviolate, and since the enactment of modern procedural reforms, this has been
held to guarantee a trial by jury in those cases in which before the procedural
change, the parties would have been entitled to a jury's verdict.35 In many cases,
however, the parties do not care which form of trial is adopted, and in others,
trial by the court might be preferred by both litigants. In such cases, where a
trial by jury has been waived, all difficulty would be removed.38  Furthermore,
even though different forms of trial should prove necessary in some instances
because of asserted constitutional rights, this distinction should not give rise to
a classification of pleadings as either legal or equitable. Nevertheless, certain
courts, influenced by the historical separation of law and equity, fix upon this
28. ALA. CODE (Michie, x928) §§ 6486, 6488; AiuE. DIG. STAT. (Crawford & Moses,
1921) § IO4I; D. C. CODE (I93o) tit. 24, § 14; IOWA CODE (X93I) § 10944; KY. PRACr. CODE
(Carroll, 1927) § 8; ME. REv. STAT. (1930) c. 96, § i7; MD. CODE ANN. (Bagley, 1924) art.
26, § 44; M-ASS. GEN. LAWS (1932) c. 231, § 55; MICH. Comp. LAwS (1929) § 14003; MISS.
CODE ANN. (1930) §§,351, 491; N. J. ComP. LAWS (Cum. Supp. 1925) § 163-348;
Omi. CODE ANN. (I930) § 6-102; PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1931) tit. 12, § 1228; VT. GEN.
LAWS (1917) § 1797; VA. CODE ANt. (Michie, 193o) § 6o84; W. VA. CODE (Michie, 1932)
§ 5566. See also Sleeper v. Kelley, 65 N. H. 206, x8 Atl. 718 (889).
29. 38 STAT. 956 (1915), 28 U. S. C. A. §397 (928) ; cf. Waldo v. Wilson, 231 Fed. 654
(C. C. A. 4th, I916) with Liberty Oil Co. v. Condon Nat. Bank, 26o U. S. 235, 241 (1922).
30. See for example Wisper v. Dix-Ferndale Land Co., 241 Mich. 91, 216 N. W. 393
(1927) and Schoenthal v. Irving Trust Co., 287 U. S. 92 (1932).
31. To the effect that a judgment of dismissal will be reversed, see Greenup County v.
Maysville R. R., 88 Ky. 659, II S. W. 774 (I889); Costley v. Smith, 278 Pa. 242, 122 At.
280 (1923). Contra: Rucker & Co. v. Glennan, 130 Va. 5II, 107 S. E. 725 (I921).
32. Atlantic Greyhound Lines of W. Va. v. Metz, 7o F. (2d) 166 (C. C. A. 4th, 1934);
Wood's Guardian v. Inter-Southern Life Ins. Co., 224 Ky. 579, 6 S. W. (2d) 712 (1928).
Cf. Fay v. Hill, 249 Fed. 415 (C. C. A. 8th, 1918) (affirming a judgment made in equity
which should have been rendered at law).
33. To those already mentioned should be added Delaware and Florida. Cf. Illinois Fin.
Co. v. Interstate Credit Assoc., II Del. Ch. 349, IOI Atl. 870 (1917) ; REv. CODE DEL. (1915)
§ 3844; First Nat. Bank of Leesburg v. Mackenzie, ioo Fla. 1674, 131 So. 790 (0931).
34. E. 9. U. S. CoNsT., Art. VII; N. Y. CoxsT., art. I, § 2; Tmn. CoNsT., art. I, § 15.
35. Smith v. Rowe, 4 Cal. 6 (1853) ; Sands v. Kimbark, 27 N. Y. 147 (1863) ; Callanan
v. Judd, 23 Wis. 343 (1868) ; see CONN. GEN. STAT. (1930) § 5624. See generally CLARK,
CODE PLEADING (1928) 52 et seq.; Scott, Trial by Jury and the Reform. of Civil Procedure
(1918) 31 HARv. L. REv. 669.
36. Cf. Gavahan v. Village of Shorewood, 200 Wis. 429, 228 N. W. 497 (I93O). For a
discussion of statutory provisions and an extended analysis of the entire problem, see CI~n,
loc. cit. supra note 35.
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variation in trial to fortify their conclusion that the difference between the two
fields of law is fundamental and beyond the reach of legislative fiat.-
Assuming, however, that the attorney correctly selects his remedy as being
one at law, he may still be hampered by the necessity of proceeding upon a definite
theory up to final judgment. While legislatures in nearly all states have modified
the common law requirement that the action be strictly appropriate, many of the
old writs are still recognized in certain jurisdictions. In Alabama,3 the District
of Columbia, 9 Florida,4 Delaware, 41 Georgia, 42 Maine,43 Maryland, 44 Massa-
chusetts,4 Michigan, 46 Pennsylvania, 47 Vermont,48 Virginia 4 9 and Rhode Is-
land,"0 it would seem necessary to make a proper selection from certain common
law forms if judgment is to be entered on the original complaint. So in Virginia,
assumpsit, debt, detinue, and trespass are still recognized as separate forms of
action. 51 Rhode Island courts will hold a complaint in trespass demurrable if it
appears that the facts averred require an action on the case.3 ' While equally
strict rulings might be expected in all common law jurisdictions, liberal applica-
tion of the rules regarding amendment has rendered the choice of an inappro-
priate action less fatal.'- In Peasley v. Dudley,4 for instance, after trial in the
lower court on a theory of trover, the appellate court ordered an amendment
from trover to assumpsit in order to support a judgment for the plaintiff.
In states where the statute has abolished or combined the common law
forms, changes in theory which amount to what would have been a change in the
37. See, for example, Reubens v. Joel, 13 N. Y. 488 at 498 (1856) ; cf. Young v. Vail, 29
N. M. 324, 350, 222 Pac. 912, 916 (0924) (indicating that separate systems continue to exist)
with MAITLAND, EQUITY (1929) 20. See generally, Clark, The Union of Law and Equity
(2925) 25 CoL L. Rv. I.
38. See Lawrence v. Seay, 179 Ala. 386, 392, 6o So. 937, 939 (1912).
39. Cf. D. C. CODE (193O) tit. 24, c. 7 and § 51; see Miller v. Ambrose, 35 App. D. C. 75,
8i (191o).
40. Cf. FLA. ComP. GEN. LAWS (Skillman, 1928) §§ 5309, 5342, 5886; Dekle v. Calhoun,
6o Fla. 53, 53 So. 1i4 (I9o) ; Woodham v. Hill, 78 Fla. 517, 83 So. 727 (2920).
41. Cf. DEL. REv. CODE (2915) §§ 4167, 4177, 4185; Marley v. Duff, 2 Boyce 312, 8o Atl.
235 (Del. Super. Ct. 1911).
42. GA. CODE (Michie, 1926) §§ 4483, 4485, 5508, 555o; cf. Ga. Iron & Coal Co. v. Alli-
son, x16 Ga. 444, 42 S. E. 794 (902).
43. ME. REv. STAT. (I930) c. 96, §§26, 27; cf. Cook v. Curtis, 125 Me. 114, 232 Atl. 2o4
(1925).
44. MD. CODE ANN. (Bagby, 1924) art. 75, § 4; cf. Smith v. Woman's Medical College,
1o Md. 441, 72 Atl. 22o7 (ipo).
45. MAss. GEN. LAws (1932) c. 232, §§ 1, 9, 52, 238.
46. Micn. CoMNP. LAWS (1929) § 24007; cf. Globe & Rutgers Fire Ins. Co. v. Fisher, 234
Mich. 258, 207 N. W. 884 (1926).
47. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 2931) tit. 12, §§ 2, 2, 1821; id. (Supp. 2934) § 4; cf. Reilly
v. Crown Petroleum Co., 223 Pa. 595, 63 Atl. 253 (1906).
48 (. LAWS VT. (0917) § 1789; cf. Deavitt v. Corry, 90 Vt. 531, 98 At. ooo (2916).
49. VA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 293o) §§ 5759, 5760, 5784, 5797, 6o86, 6o88; cf. W. VA.
CODE (Michie, 1932) §§ 3556, 5419, 5463, 5473, 5479, 5484, 5485, 5495.
.o. Mossessian v. Callender, McAuslan & Troup Co., 24 R. I. 168, 52 Atl. 806 (I9O2);
Conroy v. Equitable Accident Co., 27 R. I. 467, 63 At]. 356 (29o6) ; cf. R. I. GEN. LAws
(2923) § 4874; McKendall v. Nat. Wholesale Confectionery Co., 50 R. 1. 424, 148 Atl. 315
(930).
.51 VA. CODE ANx. (Michie, 1930) §§ 5759, 576o, 5784, 5797, 6086, 6088.
52. Mossessian v. Callender, McAuslan & Troup Co., 24 R. I. 168, 52 Atl. 806 (2902).
53. Singletary v. Milwaukee Tool & Forge Co., 25 Ala. App. 573, 252 So. 599 (0933)
(common counts to detinue) ; Eby v. Concord Heights Co., 4 Boyce 482, 90 Atl. 40 (Del.
Super. 1914) (case to covenant) ; United States Realty & Inv. Co. v. Rummery, 136 Me. 176,
I68 Atl. 809 (I933) ; De Bebian v. Gola, 64 Md. 262, 2i At. 275 (0885) (assumpsit to cov-
enant) ; Librandi v. O'Keefe, 44 R. I. 49, 115 Atl. 241 (1921).
54. 63 N. H. 220 (1884).
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form of action before the code are generally allowed ;55 but a shift from tort to
contract, with or without amendment, is likely to be fatal.50 This differentiation
may be attributed in part to the fact that questions regarding jurisdiction,
57 civil
arrest,"' the statute of limitations," and the nature of the defendant's plea 60
depend on recognition of a difference between tort and contract. In addition a
change from one of these two fields to the other may involve introduction of a
theory affirming a contract which has been disaffirmed by the original theory or
vice versa. Thus it is frequently attempted to discard a theory of deceit based
on false representations of the defendant in making a contract and to sue for
money had and received on the theory of rescission. In this situation the refusal
to permit a change of theory is ordinarily based on the doctrine of election of
remedies, and splits of authority are largely a result of the variety of holdings
on election.," While these differing incidents of tort and contract may require
limitation of the plaintiff to his original theory in a case where one of such
incidents is contested, there appears to be no compelling reason for prohibiting a
change as a general rule. Among other jurisdictions, 62 New York has of late
allowed this shift of theory,6" but the opinion of the court in Uhl v. Gayley 64
suggests that laxity in pleading is countenanced with great reluctance. In sus-
taining a complaint on the theory of contract which had been upheld in the lower
court on a theory of tort, Judge Shearn said:
"If there were anything left of the science of pleading, this complaint
would promptly be held insufficient. Apparently, however, it is the duty of
the court to sift from a maze of evidentiary matter sufficient allegations to
constitute a cause of action." 65
Another situation in which the necessity of adhering to a definite theory is
frequently argued is the one in which a theory of statutory liability is advanced
at some point in the proceeding. In Shade v. Ash Cement Co.,66 the complaint
55. Warder v. Hutchinson, 69 Cal. App. 291, 231 Pac. 563 (1924) ; Lowery Co. v. Lamp,
200 Iowa 853, 2o5 N. W. 538 (1925); Kunz v. Ward, 28 Kan. 132 (1882); McDonald v.
Young, 198 Mich. 62o, 165 N. W. 678 (1917). Cf. Crowder v. Fordyce Lumber Co.. 93 Ark.
392, 125 S. W. 417 (191o) ; Houts v. Dutham, 162 Mo. App. 477, 142 S. W. 8o6 (1912) ; see
Wentz v. Lithicum, 76 Cal. App. 486, 488, 245 Pac. 205, 2o6 (1926) ; Lee Tung v. Burkhart,
59 Ore. I94, 206, 116 Pac. io66, io69 (i9i).
56. McDonald v. Hill, 132 Ark. 368, 202 S. W. 5o9 (igi8) ; Houze v. Blackwell, 2o Ga.
App. 438, 93 S. E. 6 (1917) ; PomEioy, COD. Rn. anEs (5th ed. 1929) § 452. See Whit-
tenden Mfg. Co. v. Memphis & Ohio River Packet Co., 21 Fed. 896 at goo (1884). Cf.
Cramer v. Healey, 48 R. I. 183, 136 Atl. 763 (1927) with Librandi v. O'Keefe, 44 R. I. 49,
zi5 At. 241 (1921). See also Mathieson Alkali Works v. Va. Banner Coal Corp., 147 Va.
125, 136 S. E. 673 (1927).
57. Cf. Thomas v. Schram, 52 Mich. 213, 17 N. W. 815 (1883).
58. Elwood v. Gardner, 45 N. Y. 349 (1871). Cf. Hartford v. Smith, 199 Fed. 763 (C.
C. A. 3d, 1912).
59. Russell & Co. v. Polk County Abs. Co., 87 Iowa 233, 54 N. W. 212 (1893).
6o. Rauh v. Stevens, 21 Ind. App. 65o, 52 N. E. 997 (1899) ; Parry v. First Nat. Bank,
270 Pa. 556, 113 Atl. 847 (i92i) ; cf. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1g31) tit. 12, § 412.
61. Cf. Gutterman v. Gaily, 131 Cal. App. 647, 21 P. (2d) 1000 (1933) ; Donovan v. Cur-
tis, 245 Mich. 348, 222 N. W. 743 (1929) with Annis v. Reiser, 209 Mich. 512, 177 N. W. 212
(i92o) ; Richards v. Goldstein, 124 Neb. 438, 246 N. W. 925 (1933). See also Urdang v.
Posner, 22o App. Div. 6o9, 222 N. Y. Supp. 396 (Ist Dep't 1927).
62. Cf. U. S. Tire Co. v. Kirk & Aspey, i02 Kan. 418, 270 Pac. 81I (ii8); Hemmin-
dinger v. Gitter, 7 N. J. Misc. 1115, 148 Atl. 15 (Sup. Ct. 1929) ; Nock v. Coca Cola Bottling
Works, 1O2 Pa. Super. 515, 156 Atl. 537 (1g31) ; New York & Pa. Co. v. New York Cent.
IL R., 267 Pa. 64, IiO Atl. 286 (192o).
63. Feldblum Realty Corp. v. City of N. Y., 150 Misc. 622, 269 N. Y. Supp. 793 (N. Y.
City Ct. 1934).
64. I81 App. Div. 8o2, 169 N. Y. Supp. 191 (xst Dep't I918).
65. Id. at 8o3, 169 N. Y. Supp. at 192.
66. 92 Kan. 146, 139 Pac, 193 (1914).
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charged negligence and relied on a Factory Act as supporting the defendant's
liability, but it appeared that the facts alleged would allow recovery only under
the Workmen's Compensation Act. In ruling that it was error to dismiss the
complaint, the Kansas Supreme Court stated that the plaintiff should be per-
mitted any remedy to which he should prove himself entitled. On the other
hand, the Indiana case of Qilithic Stone Co. v. Ridge 67 took a less liberal view.
There the lower court had entered judgment for the plaintiff on a statutory
theory, but pending appeal the statute in question was pronounced unconstitu-
tional. Although the Court of Appeals upheld the judgment by allowing the
plaintiff to adopt a common law theory of liability, the Supreme Court reversed
this ruling and stated that the plaintiff was bound to follow his original theory.
While this decision is supported by the general principle that the theory adopted
at trial must be followed on appeal, 68 the court's language was sufficiently broad
to permit the inference that no such shift would have been allowed even during
trial. In general, it may be said that the view a court will take on this point
depends on whether or not it believes that the change in theory involves a change
in cause of action 69 or prejudices the defendant by way of surprise.
A final group of cases related to the question under consideration are those
in which a change of theory is objected to chiefly because it involves the intro-
duction of evidence different from that required by the original theory. Thus a
court which exhibits no reluctance in permitting a change from tort to contract
where the complaint contains facts sufficient for either theory, might refuse to
allow a plaintiff who has declared on a written contract to recover on an oral one.
Moreover, where a change in theory appears to have been disallowed because it
involved a change in form of action, investigation may reveal that the truly objec-
tionable element lay in the pleader's varying his theory of the facts. On the
other hand: in these cases in which a factual shift co-exists with a jump from one
legal category to another, it is often difficult, if not impossible, to decide which
element was more influential in actuating a court's rejection of an attempted
change in theory. While discussion of this factual change necessarily impinges
upon the cases previously treated and upon the law regarding variance, it has
been considered important 70 to determine whether such a change can be per-
mitted independently of the rule on variance, the differences between tort and
contract, and the distinctions between law and equity.
In this situation the courts of Indiana have most consistently required the
plaintiff to stand or fall upon his original theory. In the recent case of Indian-
apolis Real Estate Board v. Willson,71 a judgment for the plaintiff was reversed
because having declared on an express contract, he proved an implied promise
only. This ruling was made on the ground that the major theory of the pleader
had been one of express contract, despite the fact that the complaint contained
facts which might have justified a quantum meruit recovery. Again, a plaintiff
who has opened his case on the theory of negligence cannot later urge that the
injury was wilful, since the new theory requires different facts."2 A long series
of decisions stating the same requirement could be cited from the reports of this
state.73
Whether or not a definite theory of the facts must be adhered to in other
jurisdictions is a question which cannot be answered with finality. The author-
67. i69 Ind. 639, 83 N. E. 246 (i9o8).
68. ELLIoT, APPELLATE PRocEruRE (1892) c. 24.
69. CLARK, CODE PLEADING (1928) 514.
70. See, for example, Note (I934) 5o L. R. A. (N. s.) 3 at 9.
71. 187 N. E. 46o (Ind. App. 1933).
72. Gregory, Adm'r v. Cleveland R. R., 312 Ind. 385, 14 N. E. 228 (1887).
73. See Note (1914) 5o L. R. A. (N. S.) 3, n. 26.
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ities are divided on the situation in which a plaintiff who has declared on a special
contract proves an implied one only.74 In other cases, the courts in one jurisdic-
tion have often reached apparently inconsistent conclusions. Thus in Conaughty
v. Nichols, 75 a New York case, the defendant was held liable in contract when
the plaintiff failed to prove a conversion as alleged. But a more recent New
York decision refused to allow a plaintiff who had averred an executed contract
to recover on proof of an executory one. 70 In California, the case of Hayes v.
Fine 77 refused to permit a plaintiff who had alleged that he was the purchaser of
a plot of land to recover as owner. Yet in Zelln-er v. Wassmann,7s a plaintiff who
had sought specific performance was allowed to recover on a quantum mneruit
when he had failed to prove a contract valid under the statute of frauds. In
other states, likewise, the decisions leave in doubt the necessity of adhering to a
definite theory of the facts.
70
Fortunately, however, this apparent inconsistency is rendered less confusing
when the exact nature of the problem is considered. With statutory relaxation
of the rule regarding variance and with the abolition of the old forms of action,
the statement that "a definite theory must be followed" was apparently substi-
tuted to limit the field in which the plaintiff could proceed and thus protect the
defendant from surprise. In the sense that a theory of fact was required, it
appears that courts were restating the law against variance. Thus while an early
Indiana case held that proof of a special contract under an allegation of implied
promise constituted a "fatal variance", °0 a more recent decision refused to allow
a change from special contract to quantum meruit on the ground that "a plaintiff
must proceed upon a definite theory." -I The existence of decisions refusing to
allow a change in "theory" where the variance would not necessarily have been
fatal, points to the inferiority of the more modern phrase.8 2 For while the more
liberal rules of variance were based on recognition of the fact that the problem
varied with each case, the statement that a plaintiff must adhere to a definite
theory is dangerously general and hence susceptible of an unnecessarily restrictive
application. Yet if this explanation be correct, the apparently vague and unre-
solved element in the law of many jurisdictions becomes less confusing.
In summarizing, it is obviously not possible to make any generalization as
to whether or not a complaint must contain a definite theory on which the plain-
tiff will stand or fall. As has been indicated, a shift in "theory" may mean a
change (i) from law to equity, (2) from one common law form to another,
74. To the effect that such a change is allowable, see Zellner v. Wassman, 184 Cal. So,
193 Pac. 84 (192o) ; Lipe v. Citizens' Bank & Trust Co., 206 N. C. 24, 30, 173 S. E. 316, 319
(934). Contra: Harris v. Hammel, 3o Ohio Dec. 525 (1925); Wilson v. McKee, iio Pa.
Super. 544, 168 Atl. 341 (934) ; see Bloom v. Vehon Co., 341 Ill. 200, 207, 173 N. E. 270,
273 (1930).
75. 42 N. Y. 83 (i87o).
76. Walrath v. Hanover Fire Ins. Co., 216 N. Y. 220, iio N. E. 426 (i915).
77. 91 Cal. 391,27 Pac. 772 (i891).
78. 184 Cal. 8o, 193 Pac. 84 (192o).
79. Cf. Howle v. Fry, 2 Ohio L. Abstract 489 (1924) with Harris v. Hammel, 30 Ohio
Dec. 525 (1912). Cf. Mosely v. Boyd, 167 Okla. 485, 30 P. (2d) 897 (934) with Gustin v.
Carshall, 156 Okla. 173, io P. (2d) 250 (1932). Cf. Grentner v. Fehrenschield, 64 Kan. 764,
68 Pac. 61g (19o2) ; Davis v. Union State Bank, 137 Kan. 264, 20 P. (2d) 508 (1933) with
Cockerell v. Henderson, 81 Kan. 335, 105 Pac. 443 (9o9).
So. Riley v. Walker, 6 Ind. App. 622, 34 N. E. Ioo (1892).
81. Indianapolis Real Estate Board v. Willson, 187 N. E. 4oo (Ind. App. 1933).
82. Cf. Louisville, Albany and Chicago R. R. v. Barnes, 16 Ind. App. 312 (1896) (refus-
ing to allow change from implied promise to special contract on double ground that there
had been a failure of proof and that plaintiff must recover on his original theory) with Ran-
dolph v. King, 74 Ind. App. 68, 127 N. E. 20 (192o) (permitting such a change). See also
Armacoast v. Lindley, 116 Ind. 295, ig N. E. 138 (1888).
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(3) from tort to contract, (4) from one statute to another or from a statute to
common law, (5) from one group of facts to another. While the last change
frequently accompanies one of the first four in a given case, separate classification
is important in that somewhat different considerations govern the courts in each
class. Since the purpose to be served, protection of the defendant from surprise,
requires the exercise of discretion in each case, it would be extremely unfortunate
if the holdings showed that degree of uniformity which the categorical nature
of the phrase, "A plaintiff must proceed upon a definite theory", might lead one
to expect.
On the other hand, it may be profitably stated that an attorney is often
unreasonably restricted to a single theory.8 In many states much difficulty can
be avoided by statement of the same cause of action in different ways in separate
counts so as to meet developments in the evidence and safeguard the cause in a
field where the law is doubtful.8 4 Yet rules against misjoinder, and requirements
of election between varying counts during trial s5 remain to qualify the value of
separate statement as an avenue of escape. Furthermore, where the court con-
tinues to recognize a distinction between legal and equitable causes of action, a
prayer in the alternative for equitable or legal relief will naturally be made in
vain. Finally, there are the cases in which a lawyer who has reasonably framed
his complaint on only one theory finds a change necessary because of unforeseen
developments at the trial. These dangers threaten even the expert. On the
other hand, admittedly defective pleading at the start should not always result in
dismissal when a right to relief is later shown and the defendant has not been
prejudiced. It would therefore seem proper (I) to uphold a complaint on demur-
rer if it states facts sufficient to show that on any theory the plaintiff is entitled to
judgment; and (2) safeguarding the rights of the defendant against surprise, to
allow changes of theory during trial.
B.V.L.
POWER OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT TO COMPETE WITH PRIVATE ENTER-
PRIsE-Almost all activities of government may be said, in one sense, to compete
with private enterprise, since conceivably they can be performed by individual
initiative. Functions now regarded as proper only for the state have been in
other times privately exercised. Thus in various civilizations raising and main-
taining military forces have been the subject of private effort, as they still are,
to some extent, in modern China. In Rome, as well as in France before the
Revolution, the collection of taxes was a franchise conferred upon citizens by
the state-at a price. A patrician would probably have been horrified by a sub-
versive suggestion that the private business of tax collecting be handled by the
empire.
In popular significance, however, the term "competition" is somewhat more
limited. It denotes a clash of existing economic interests and consequently is
not applied to fields in which private participation has been wholly supplanted.
Nor is the government generally recognized as a competitor when it furnishes
83. See generally, Albertsworth, The Theory of Code Pleading (1922) IO CALIF. L. REv.
202; Whittier, The Theory of a Pleading (i9o8) 8 COL. L. REv. 523.
84. CLARK, CODE PLEADING (1928) 312.
85. Williams v. Pittsfield Lime & Stone Co., 258 Mass. 65, 154 N. E. 572 (1927) ; Red-
linger & Handson Co. v. Parker, 62 N. D. 483, 243 N. W. 792 (1932) ; McCauley v. Wells,
132 Misc. 424, 23o N. Y. Supp. 148 (N. Y. City Ct. 1928) ; but cf. Wheelock v. Zevitas, 229
Mass. 167, 118 N. E. 279 (I918); Brodsky v. Hibel, 94 Misc. 312, 158 N. Y. Supp. 329 (Sup.
Ct. 1916).
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services to the community as a return for taxes, even though there are in exist-
ence individuals who will sell similar services.1 For the state to be considered as
engaging in "business", it must invite the patronage of the public and exact a
charge from the individual purchaser of goods or services, instead of distributing
the cost among the community as a whole, and without regard to anyone's enjoy-
ment of a share proportionate to his contribution.2 Such a conception excludes,
of course, services rendered by one arm of government to another, as where a
state prints its necessary documents on its own presses.
The description heretofore advanced is not to be taken too literally; the
qualifying element of social psychology is always present. Thus a community
generating its own electricity is commonly considered to be "competing" with
private power companies, even though the public plant may be supported by tax-
ation. Furthermore, some public enterprises, of which the postal service is one,
depend on both taxes and fees. On the whole, however, the characteristics men-
tioned are those generally associated with the concept of "competition".
It is with the power of the federal government to engage in this "competi-
tion" that the present note is concerned. That the government has hitherto par-
ticipated extensively in activities of such nature is common knowledge, while
certain projects now much in the public eye, notably the Tennessee Valley experi-
ment,' have aroused popular interest.4 With the development of governmental
financing of private businesses the matter is likely to arise with a vengeance.
Already the administration has assumed control of a railroad as a result of
default on an R. F. C. loan,5 and it requires no great imagination to visualize its
acquiring banks and farms in a similar manner.
Yet if the federal government has entered into rivalry with private interests
with comparative frequence, legal tests of its right to do so have been few. For
this deficiency several explanations may be offered, of which some are legal,
others extra-legal. First is the difficulty of maintaining a suit directly contesting
the legitimacy of the government's ventures. That bite noir of other socialisti-
cally minded governmental units-a taxpayer's suit to enjoin expenditure of
public funds for an "illegal" private purpose-is of no avail against officials of
the United States. The individual's interest in Congressional appropriations is
considered too inconsequential to permit his maintaining such an action.6 The
case so holding is comparatively recent, but there had previously been a manifes-
tation of the Supreme Court's disapproval of such litigation. 7 Furthermore,
should not a citizen but a state seek to restrain national projects it would en-
counter the. onus of the Court's insistence on a "justiciable issue" beyond a mere
abstract question of sovereignty or politics."
When the government's power is called into question it will usually be in a
controversy arising from either of two situations: (I) in a defense to con-
demnation proceedings, in which the legislative sanction of administrative action
i. E. g., digging sewers, maintaining schools.
2. As where a state imposes an income tax, partly for the benefit of educational institu-
tions, upon a childless millionaire.
3. 48 STAT. 58 (1933), i6 U. S. C. A. § 831 (Supp, 1934).
4. Decriers of "government in business" may be able to derive a certain lugubrious con-
solation from the fact that such ventures frequently make use of a private device, the cor-
poration. Note (1935) 83 U. OF PA. L. RFv. 346.
5. TimF, December 31, 1934, at 36, 37.
6. Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 447 (923), (1923) 72 U. OF PA. L. REv. 72.
7. Wilson v. Shaw, 204 U. S. 24 (I9O7) reserved decision on the point and found ad-
versely to the plaintiff on the merits of the case. The court's attitude is, however, definitely
hostile to the suit. See at 30, 31.
8. Cf. Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U. 447 (0923), (1923) 72 U. OF PA. L. REV. 72;
New Jersey v. Sargent, 269 U. S. 328 (1926).
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may be attacked as ultra vires;I or (2) in an attempt by a state to tax or regulate
an enterprise in which the federal government has become a participant.10 Of
these, the first will arise infrequently. Eminent domain is ordinarily asserted
against persons other than those who will suffer from the state's competition, and
whose interest is not in thwarting its design but in extracting for themselves the
best possible price. In the second class of cases, the issue will usually be not
whether the national government is engaging in wholly unwarranted activity, but
whether the character of its action or instrumentality is such as to invoke immu-
nity from state taxation or control.
Still other practical difficulties exist. The interests of even the individuals
most severely affected are generally too little impaired to induce a court fight
against a formidable opponent." Not every taxpayer is sufficiently embattled
to struggle all the way to the Supreme Court in a valiant, if vain, attempt to
prevent construction of the Panama Canal.
12
Not uncommonly, moreover, the government's entrance into a particular new
field is by way of some corner which the private enterprises concerned are only
too glad to forsake. Thus the federal government has become a great banking
institution in that it lends money on security to its citizens. But the borrowers
are almost invariably persons unable to obtain credit from private sources.'2
The importance of this latter phase is not to be underestimated. Government
having once entered upon a certain pursuit is loath to relinquish it. Its activity
tends as well to permeate far beyond the seemingly innocuous source. As a
consequence, a whole industry may suddenly make the disconcerting discovery
that the government is drawing some of the wine, as well as the dregs. By that
time, the government's participation is regarded as quite normal, and one who
would combat it is under a psychological disadvantage before the courts. It is
not only in diplomacy that faits accomplis have significance.'
4
Finally, federal administrations are something with which to reckon. It is
no light undertaking to combat their pet projects. They control machinery of
devastating potentiality-for one instance, taxation. They can confer favors,
such as tariffs, and consequently can withhold or withdraw them as well. Recent
events have illustrated a technic on the part of the present administration em-
bodying the principle that a good defense does not preclude a strategic offense.13
If there is legal justification for federal competition, it must exist in the
Constitution. From the outset it may be granted that the framers of the Con-
stitution had no contemplation of this variety of governmental behavior. Had
9. Cf. Alabama Power Co. v. Gulf Power Co., 283 Fed. 6o6 (M. D. Ala. 1922).
io. Cf. California v. Central Pac. R. R., 127 U. S. 1 (1888) ; Dakota Cent. Telephone
Co. v. South Dakota, 250 U. S. 163 (1gig).
II. Yet the constitutionality of the parcel post system, which "virtually drove express
companies out of the business of carrying small packages" [Note (1934) 43 YA.LE-L. J. 815,
824] has never been litigated.
12. See Wilson v. Shaw, 204 U. S. 24 (1907), cited note 7, supra.
13. Cf. Loans to Industry Act, P. L. No. 417, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (934) § 13b (a) : "In
exceptional circumstances, when it appears to the satisfaction of a Federal Reserve bank that
ai established industrial or commercial business located in its district is unable to obtain
requisite financial assistance on a reasonable basis from the usual sources, the Federal Reserve
bank, pursuant to authority granted by the Federal Reserve Board, may make loans to, or
purchase obligations of, such business . . ." (italics supplied).
14. It is not uncommon for courts to cite what Congress has done as support for what it
may do. E. g., United States v. Coombs, 12 Pet. 72, 78, 79 (U. S. 1838) ; Stockton v. Balti-
more & N. Y. R. R., 32 Fed. 9, 15, 16 (C. C. D. N. 3. 1887), appeal dismissed, 140 U. S. 699
(i8gi) ; Hannah and Hogg v. Clyne, 263 Fed. 599, 6o4 (N. D. Ill. 1919).
15. It seems more than mere coincidence that immediately after an attack on the consti-
tutionality of T. V. A. by a representative of the power industry the President began negotia-
tions with the Mayor of New York City as to federal financing of a municipal power plant.
TIME, December 31, 1934, 33, 34.
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they possessed any such prescience, they would, it has been said,16 have embodied
an inhibiting clause within their document. In the absence of any specific pro-
hibition or, with the notable exception of the postal clause, of any express per-
mission, the prime task is to marshal a given activity within the delegated powers.
Of these, the most thoroughly exercised towards the end of engaging in
normally private enterprises have been the war powers.' 7 During the World War
the national government ehtered ihdustry as never before nor since.' 8  Most
striking was its assumption of full control of transportation and communication
facilities.
The Supreme Court has never passed directly upon the legality of the war-
time operation of railroads. Yet that Congress was acting within its Constitu-
tional war prerogatives is hardly doubtful. There is dictum ' to that effect, as
well as opinions 20 which have assumed, without argument, the validity of its
grant of control to executive agencies. Even more important is a decision 21
which cannot possibly be 'reconciled with a view towards unconstitutionality, and
which has been considered tantamount to an actual ruling on the point
-. 2 2  Sup-
porting authority from lesser courts is not lacking.
23
In similar fashion, the legality bf the requisitioning of private shipping has
been tacitly assumed,24 and in one decision is more or less inherent.
2 5
The war powers likewise enabled Congress to authorize the President's tak-
ing possession of the telephone lines 26 and of the cables.2 7  It was also within
the national government's rights to provide housing for workers engaged in
defense industries.
2
8
The requisitioiing of private property for war purposes is in the nature of
a right of eminent ddmain. 29 Congress could probably assume control, under it,
of any or all industry whenever the prosecution of hostilities would thereby be
aided, providing, of course, that just compensation be proffered. 30
i6. See South Carolina v. United States, 39 Ct. CI. 257, 284, 285 (1904), aff'd, 1g U. S.
437 (1905).
17. U. S. CONsT. Art. I, § 8, el. ii-i6.
i8. See generally, VAN DORN, GOVERNMENT OWNED CORPORATIONS (1926); W. F. WIL-
LOUGHBY, GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION IN WAR TIME AND AFTR (i919), especially cc. II,
VIII.
ig. See Dupont de Nemours & Co. v. Davis, 264 U. S. 456, 462 (1924).
20. Missouri Pac. R. R. v. Ault, 256 U. S. 554 (1921); North Carolina R. R. v. Lee,
260 U. S. i6 (1922).
21. Northern Pac. Ry. v. North Dakota, 250 U. S. 135 (919) (state has no authority to
regulate intrastate rates after carrier is taken under federal control).
22. See Dakota Cent. Telephone Co. V. South Dakota, 250 U. S. 163, 183 (1919) ; Globe
& Rutgers Fire Ins. Co. v. Hines, 273 Fed. 774, 780 (C. C. A. 2d, 1921) ; Public Service
Comm. v. New York Cent. R. R., 23o N. Y. 149, ,52, ,53, 129 N. E. 455, 456 (i92o).
23. Cf. Wainwright v. Pennsylvania R. R., 253 Fed. 459 (E. D. Mo. I918) (fixing venue
for actions against carriers under federal conttol is within Congress' war powers) ; see Pub-
lic Service Comm. v. New York Cent. R. R., 23o N. Y. 149, 152, 229 N. E. 455, 456 (I92O).
24. The Lake Monroe, 250 U. S. 246 (I919).
25. United State v. Porto Rico Fruit Union, 12 F. (2d) 96I (C. C. A. Ist, 1926) (United
States may recover freight charges accruing from commercial operation of shipping in war
time).
26. Dakota Cent. Telephone Co. v. South Dakota, 250 U. S. 163 (2929) (state cannot
regulate intrastate telephone business after federal assumption of control) ; Read v. Ceit.
Union Telephone Co., 213 Ill. App. 246 (1919).
27. Commercial Cable Co. v. Burleson, 255 Fed. 99 (S. D. N. Y. I919), re'd as having
become moot pending appeal, 250 U. S. 360 (igig); which also declares that the President's
act was authorized as well by his constitutional power to negotiate a peace treaty.
28. Cf. United States v. Stein, 48 F. (2d) 626, 628 (N. D. Ohio 1921).
29. See North Carolina R. R. v. Lee, 266 U. S. I6, i7 (1922) ; Dupont ibe Nemours &
Co. v. Davis, 264 U. S. 456, 462 (1924).
3o. See 3 V. W. WILLOUGHBY, CosTruvio OF THE UNITED STAIaS (2d ed. 1929)
§§ 1633, i035.
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The comprehensiveness of the power which arises in connection with war-
fare does not necessarily expire with the cessation of hostilities. How long it is
available cannot be said; the one thing certain is that it may survive actual war-
fare and even the concluding of peace." In the words of a leading case,
32
"... the [war] power is not limited to victories in the field and the disper-
sion of the insurgent forces. It carries with it inherently the power to guard
against the immediate renewal of the conflict, and to remedy the evils which
have arisen from its rise and progress."
Aside from the possibilities occasioned by warfare, it would seem unquestion-
able that the war powers justify such activities as the manufacture, in peace
time, of munitions and other military supplies. While these instances of the
government's providing materials for the use of one of its own agencies are not
in themselves within the scope of the present treatment, they become pertinent
-in relation to the disposition of surplus property owned by the state.3
Not war, but peace, is conducive to the utmost expansion of the postal
powers.34 These were regarded by the authors of the Constitution, men ever
jealous of possible governmental usurpation, as entirely innocent prerogatives.85
"The power of establishing post roads," said Madison, "must, in every view, be
a harmless power." 36
But powers are not always so "harmless" as they seem. Few branches of
government have undergone the expansion of the postal service, which at present
exercises "banking, express, and unemployment, agency " 37 functions, in addition
to carrying the mail. Yet the development of parcel post, money order service,
and postal-savings bank has occurred without judicial challenge. Of these the
first may be supported by the doctrine that postal facilities may keep pace with
the developments of time and progress; 3s the money order system has been said
to be proper as a transmission of money by mail ;3 while the bank may fall within
Congress' borrowing power.
40
The postal clause has also been relied on to permit Congress to construct, or
authorize the construction of, highways and railroads.41  Accordingly, there is
no longer room for the old controversy 42 as to whether the right to "establish
31. Cf. Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries & Warehouse Co., 251 U. S. 146 (igi) (War-
Time Prohibition Act approved IO days after Armistice is a proper exercise of the war
powers) ; Commercial Trust Co. of N. J. v. Miller, 262 U. S. 51 (1923) (operation of Trad-
ing with the Enemy Act not automatically suspended by legal termination of war) ; Com-
mercial Cable Co. v. Burleson, 255 Fed. 99 (S. D. N. Y. i919), rev'd as having become mnoot
pending appeal, 250 U. S. 36o (1919).
32. Stewart v. Kahn, ii Wall. 493, 507 (U. S. 387o). And see Lajoie v. Milliken, 242
Mass. 5o8, 521, 136 N. E. 419, 423 (922).
33. See note 57, infra.
34. U. S. COxST. Art. I, § 8. cl. 7.
35. ROGERS, THE POSTAL PowERs OF CONcRESS (1916) (Johns Hopkins University
Studies in Historical and Political Science, ser. xxxiv, no. 2) c. I.
36. THE FEDEALIsT, No. 42.
37. Black, Soc'alism and the Constitittion (933) 28 ILL. L. REv. 313, 324. For an ex-
tended treatment, see Rogers, op. cit. supra note 35, passim.
38. See Pensacola Telegraph Co. v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 96 U. S. I, 9 (1877).
39. Bolognesi v. United States, 189 Fed. 335, 336 (C. C. A. 2d, 1911), cert. denlied, 223
U. S. 726 (1911).
40. U. S. CoxsT. Art. I, § 8, cl. 2. See Rogers, op. cit. sitpra note 35, at 32, 33.
41. California v. Central Pac. R. R., 127 U. S. 1 (1887), which also relies upon the com-
merce and military powers; see Dickey v. Maysville Road Co., 7 Dana 75, 83 et seq. (Ky.
1838). But see Cleveland, P. & A. R. R. v. Franklin Canal Co., 5 Fed. Cas., No. 2,89o, at
1047 (C. C. W. D. Pa. 1853).
42. See 2 STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION (5th ed. 1891) § f128 el seq.
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post-roads" authorizes only the designation of existing roads or includes also the
right to build.
Together with the commerce powers, the postal powers have been invoked
to permit Congress effectively to charter telegraph companies, 43 on the theory
that the telegraph is an appropriate postal medium. It would appear therefrom
that Congress might furnish the public with telegraph, telephone, 44 radio and
other communication service.
The commerce powers 45 are largely co-extensive with the postal powers
insofar as they permit government to engage in competitive industry. Under
their sanction, Congress may build interstate highways.4 6  It may construct and
operate interstate railways or authorize corporations to do so.47  Operation of
telegraph lines seems permissible.4" Congress may construct and maintain an
interoceanic canal.4 9 It may build bridges 10 and may exact tolls for the use of
locks and dams owned by it in navigable streams.51
In short, the grant of "regulation" confers the legal ability to furnish the
instrumentalities upon which interstate commerce moves. It follows logically that
under its power to regulate commerce with foreign nations, somewhat more com-
prehensive than its interstate jurisdiction, 2 Congress may embark upon the
operation of oceanic shipping, as it has already done as to inland shipping.
53
Not infrequently there has arisen in connection with the commerce clause
the question of Congress' right to sell water power developed from dams operated
by the federal government. It is well settled that power developed in connection
with projects seeking to aid or control the navigability of rivers may be disposed
of at a profit or otherwise.5 4 Since the navigation projects are themselves justi-
fied by the commerce clause, the right to sell power is sometimes treated as inci-
dent thereto. To say the least, however, the connection between the regulation
of commerce and the sale of electricity is elusive. A more proper basis is avail-
able in the constitutional authority to dispose of national property.55 That energy
43. Pensacola Telegraph Co. v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 96 U. S. 1 (1877) ; Leloup
v. Port of Mobile, 127 U. S. 64o (1888).
44. This conclusion was also reached by Anderson, C. J., concurring in State ex rel.
Smith v. Burleson, 2o3 Ala. 2o8, 2o9, 82 So. 458, 459 (19,9).
45. U. S. CoNsr. Art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
46. In Indiana v. United States, 148 U. S. 148 (1893) the right to do so was assumed.
The case has since been cited as authority for the assumed proposition. See Luxton v. North
River Bridge Co., 153 U. S. 525, 529 (I894).
47. California v. Cent. Pac. R. R., 127 U. S. I (1877) ; see Monongahela Navigation Co.
v. United States, 148 U. S. 312, 341-343 (1893) ; Ballaine v. Alaska Northern Ry., 259 Fed.
183, 185 (C. C. A. 9th, I'9i).
48. Cf. Pensacola Telegraph Co. v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 96 U. S. i (1877);
Leloup v. Port of Mobile, 127 U. S. 640 (1888).
49. Wilson v. Shaw, 204 U. S. 24 (igo6), cited note 7, supra.
5o. Luxton v. North River Bridge Co., 153 U. S. 525 (1894) ; Decker v. Baltimore & N.
Y. R. R., 3o Fed. 723 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. i887) ; Stockton v. Baltimore & N. Y. R. R., 32 Fed.
9 (C. C. D. N. J. 1887).
5I. See Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U. S. 312, 337 (893).
52. 2 WILLOUGHBY, op. cit. supra note 30, § 417.
53. Through the agency of the Inland Waterways Corporation. 43 STA.T. 36o (x924), 49
U. S. C. A. § i51 (1929). See Van Dorn, op. cit. supra note I8, c. ix.
54. See United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U. S. 53, 73 (1913);
cf. Alabama Power Co. v. Gulf Power Co., 283 Fed. 6o6 (M. D. Ala. 1922) ; Waters v. Phil-
lips, 284 Fed. 237 (C. C. A. 7th, 1922); Alabama v. United States, 38 F. (2d) 897 (Ct. Cl.,
i93o) (state cannot tax manufacture and sale of water power developed by government
agency in Tennessee River); Missouri v. Union Electric Light & Power Co., 42 F. (2d) 692
(C. D. Mo. i93o), appeals dismissed, 53 F. (2d) io8o, io84 (C. C. A. 8th, i93i). See also
Green Bay & Miss. Canal Co. v. Patten Paper Co., I72 U. S. 58 (1898), where the United
States was the owner of riparian rights by state grant.
55. U. S. CoxsT. Art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
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developed in a legitimate governmental venture is such property seems beyond
cavil.
If Congress is privileged to dispose of property, it is not privileged, how-
ever, to acquire such property otherwise than in the execution of a Constitutional
power. Thus Congress would be acting ultra vires if it built dams to manufac-
ture water power for the sole purpose of sale. It may rightfully acquire water
power only as a by-product of an enterprise which bears a substantial relation to
the improvement of navigation or to some other authorized function. 56
The disposal power is not, of course, confined to the sale of energy. Con-
gress may sell any national property. Yet the ability to market must in all cases
be limited by the restriction upon the right to acquire marketable property.
Despite this limitation, the opportunities to engage in competing enterprises
under the disposal powers are considerable. Thus real estate originally acquired
for governmental purposes may quite obviously be sold or leased, and surplus
space in office buildings may be rented. Personal property likewise may be sold,
either because it has outlived its uses to the government or because an unneeded
surplus has been acquired. Familiar illustrations are supplied by the sale of
ships, when required by treaty purposes or otherwise, and the sale of army
goods.17 Furthermore, if Congress has the power to dispose of such property,
it would seem to follow that it may employ any legitimate means to exercise it,
including advertising and even establishing retail outlets. Such undertakings
could give rise to serious rivalry with purveyors of goods and land.
Questions as yet unanswered may arise in connection with the disposal
power. Is the right to market broad enough to include the right to market at a
profit by increasing the surplus to be sold? Certain property may not be dis-
posable at all, or at nothing like a good price, unless its quantity be enlarged.
Does the government have the right to add to the property by purchase or manu-
facture merely for resale purposes?
Again, in some situations it may be economically unwise to forbear to create
a surplus, even though the strict governmental purpose may not require it. Thus
must the government in erecting a post office on a valuable metropolitan site
build only to a height of four stories if that will amply supply the desired postal
facilities, or may it erect a building as tall as its neighbors and then rent the
surplus space?
Solely as a matter of practical common sense it seems that courts would
give considerable leeway in such eventualities.58 One court has already, in fact,
had before it a question of that sort. In Waters v. Phillips,5 there was involved
the right of the United States to maintain a pool for water power purposes in
the winter, when navigation would obviously derive no benefit from it. The
court held, in a decision based on alternative grounds, that the pool could be con-
tinued throughout the year.
Something of the same niture may also arise in the litigation now pending
as to the constitutionality of the sale of water power by the Tennessee Valley
56. Such authority as supports the right to sell water power, supra note 54, almost invari-
ably asserts this qualification of the right. And it was clearly settled by Kansas v. Colorado,
206 U. S. 46 (907), that Congress may not control waters of a navigable stream for purposes
not within the scope of its delegated powers. Cf. United States v. River Rouge Improvement
Co., 269 U. S. 411, 419 (1926).
57. Cf. REv. STAT. (2d ed. 1878) § 1241, IO U. S. C. A. § 1261 (927) (President may
sell any military stores unsuitable for public service) ; 41 STAT. 949 (92o), Io U. S. C. A.
§ 1262 (1927) (Secretary of War may sell surplus military stores to state or foreign govern-
ments).
58. But see Green, J. concurring specially in Alabama v. United States, 38 F. (2d) 897,
906, 907 (Ct. CI. 1930).
59. 284 Fed. 237 (C. C. A. 7th, 1922).
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Authority. In denying. a motion to dismiss a bill contesting the validity of a
T. V. A. contract, the court in Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority 1o ruled
that the governmental agency would be acting beyond any proper powers if it
should develop water power in projects bearing no "substantial relation" to the
improvement of navigability of the Tennessee River or to other functions within
the purview of the Constitution. The theoretical soundness of the holding is
beyond reproach, nor is it the court's fault that a standard of "substantial rela-
tion" is none too definite.61 The emphasis placed on the fact that the dams are
designed to produce a maximum of electrical energy rather than the greatest
benefit to navigation 62 would, however, appear misplaced. The government
might well be permitted to improve or increase its property somewhat, in order
to enhance its sale value, even if at some expense to the project which originally
justified the entire undertaking.6
It should not be supposed from the foregoing treatment that classifying an
intended competing activity within a specific power is an absolute essential. The
Gettysburg Battlefield Case 64 furnishes proof of the contrary. Therein the gov-
ernment's right to develop an historical site was derived from the alleged tendency
of the activity to increase patriotic fervor. In McCulloch v. Maryland, 5 Con-
gress was permitted to engage in banking by way of the bank of the United
States under its power to do whatever is needed to carry out its other powers.
But which of the latter were involved, the court omitted to indicate. In its rela-
tions with the Indians Congress has acquired a legally recognized privilege to
operate coal mines and sell their produce,66 although the Constitution is silent
as to the tribes beyond giving Congress the power to regulate commerce with
them. Indian relations, however, are in general sui generis and require no
constitutional sanction.
6 7
It has also been ppinted out 6 that Congress' spending and lending ability,
apparently destined to be free of legal restraint, enables it to engage in various
enterprises not pertinent to any of its delegated powers. Thus if Congress lends
money to a railroad, it must be permitted to safeguard its investment; which
means, in an extreme case, the foreclosing of a lien.
There still remains the ubiquitous hurdle of "due process". While the
Supreme Court has never passed upon the problem specifically, the probability is
that immunity from governmental competition is no more a matter of right than
immunity from private competition, particularly where the government is engag-
ing in a constitutional function. It is true of course, that government possesses
certain initial advantages, including a plethora of funds and the right of eminent
domain, as well as such incidental privileges as the obtaining of preferential tele-
graph rates.6 9 Yet disparity of opportunity, position, and practical abilities is
6o. 8 F. Supp. 893 (N. D. Ala. 1934).
61. Both administration officials and power interests considered the decision to be
prophetic of victory for their respective sides. Tifzm December io, 1934, at 6i. But only
incorrigible optimism could lead government adherents to feel that the court's language was
anything but unfavorable to the T. V. A. sale of power.
62. Ashwander Case at 896.
63. T. V. A.'s right to develop power will be argued not only as auxiliary to navigation
purposes, but also in regards to the production of nitrate for military purposes. See Note
(934) 43 YALE L. J. 8,5, 820.
64. United States v. Gettysburg Electric Ry., i6o U. S. 668 (1896).
65. 4 Wheat. 316 (U. S. i8i9).
66. Cf. Choctaw, Okla. & Gulf R. R. v. Harrison, 235 U. S. 292, 298 (1914).
67. See I WILLOUGHBY, op. cit. supra note 30, § 220.
68. See Black, sup'ra note 37, at 328.
69. Emergency Fleet Corp., United States Shipping Board v. Western Union Telegraph
Co., 275 U. S. 415 (1928).
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
too marked a characteristic of the existing economic system to excite particular
attention. That certain individuals will, as taxpayers, help finance the competition
offered to .them would seem to carry as little weight. The situation is no more
anomalous than that which exists when taxpayers finance governmental imposi-
tion of restrictions not at all to their taste. As was remarked in one case, "gen-
eally . . . no person in any business has such an interest in possible customers
as to enable him to restrain exercise of proper power of the state upon ,the ground
that he will be deprived of patronage".7 0 On the authority of the same case, how-
ever, it appears that government may not, as a rule, create by legislative. fiat a
monopoly for itself, even of an enterprise in which its right to engage is unques-
tionable. 71  f the state is to compete with private enterprise, it must suffer private
.enterpris6 to compete with it.
J.F.
RELIGIOUS CONDITIONS IN WILLs-The power of testamentary disposition.
stibject to the state's right to prescribe the circumstances under which the dis-
liositio, must be made,' is one which has received wide recognition in nearly
every civilized country today.2 The social desirability of allowing the "dead
hand" of the testator to project his own personality beyond his lifetime by means
of conditional bequests and devises has received extensive comment.3 For better
6r worse, however, it .appears to be the settled policy of the law to give effect to
the testator's intention as: far as possible.4 Conditions that the beneficiary live in
a certain locality,5 study some.trade,8 or assume a specified name 7 all have been
upheld. There are, however, certain restrictions to be noted; conditions will not
generally be upheld if they call for illegal acts5 or contravene public policy.0
Examples of. the type of conditions which the courts will regard as violating
public policy are those in total restraint of marriage,"' and those forbidding entry
into military, service." The conditions with which this note will deal, those by
means of which the testators attempt to insure the adherence of'the beneficiaries
to the testators' version of the "true faith", have received peculiarly irregular
treatment at the hands of the courts.
70. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510, 535, 536 (1925). Oregon's compulsory
education act required .the attendance of all children at the public schools during regular
school hours, with the result of. entirely depriving private schools of their students. Held,
private schools could enjoin enforcement of the statute, it being unconstitutional.
7-. But a state may, in the proper exercise of its police power to safeguard health,
rhorals and good order, create a governmental monopoly; c. g., of the sale of intoxicating
liquors. Council of Town of Farmville v. Walker, ioi Va. 323, 43 S. E. 558 (903).
I. United States v. Fox, 94 U. S. 315 (1876).
2. Harrison v. Bishop, 131 Ind. i6I, 164, 30 N. E. 2o69, IO7i (1892).
3. Such as D. Gwyther Moore, Tes.talnentary Disposition (2928) 166 L. T. 254.
4. In re Kitchen, 192 Cal. 384, 388, 22o Pac. 301, 302 (i923) ; Lanciscus v. Louisville
Trust Co., 2o Ky. 222, 225, 256 S. W, 424, 425 (1925). For a rationale of the rule see,
Tn-aPsoN, CONS'RUcTION OF WILLS (1928) 667.
5. Reeves v. Craig, 6o N. C. 209 (1864).
6. Colby v. Dean, 70 N. H. 592, 49 At. 574 (1901).
7. Smith v. Smith, 64 Neb. 563, 90 N. W. 56o (i902).
8. See Scott's Estate, 280 Pa. 9, 12, 124 Atl. 270, 271 (2924) ; Crossman v. Crossman's
Estate, 100 Vt, 407, 412, 238 Atl. 730, 732 (9.27).
9. See Holmes v. Connecticut Trust .Co., 92 Conn. 507, 524, 2o3 Atl. 640, 642 (1928);
In re Keenan's Will, 188 Wis. 163, 179, 205 N. W. 2001, 1003 (925).
IO. Randall v. Marble, 69 Me. 310 (2879). See Glass v. Johnson, 297 Ill. 149, 152, 230
N. E. 473, 474 (921).
'2. In re Beard [ 9o8] I Ch. 383.
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Apart from the question of how effective such conditions are in securing
what the testator desires, even where there is a nominal compliance as the price
of the gift, the presence of such conditions raises a difficult problem as to their
validity in law. In reaching any conclusion as to their validity two conflicting
interests must be considered, both of which the law desires to protect. First is
the law's settled policy to give effect whenever possible to the intention of the
testator. Second, and in direct conflict with this policy, is the modern concept
of both English and American law that the free exercise of religious belief is an
interest to be carefully guarded.
The validity of these conditions will be found to turn on two questions:
(i) do they violate constitutional guaranties? and (2) are they contrary to public
policy? In the United States the first question arises in connection with the
federal 12 and state 13 constitutional guaranties of religious freedom. The Su-
preme Court of Pennsylvania, in the case of Drace v. Klinedinst,14 implied that a
condition which required the beneficiaries to remain true to the testator's faith
was in violation of both the federal and state guaranties. In this the court clearly
erred. As to the federal provision, the first ten amendments represent restrictions
only on the power of the federal government to legislate ;15 hence, the attempts
of a private individual to coerce another into compliance with the religious tenets
of a given faith would clearly fall without the scope of that amendment. As to
the state constitutions, their entire purpose has been to impose restrictions on
what would otherwise be an almost unlimited power of the state governments.-6
The Supreme Court of South Carolina, in discussing its constitutional guaranty
of religious freedom, has held that a condition in a will requiring the education
of a child in a certain faith was not in violation of that guaranty.17 More strik-
ing is the Wisconsin case of In re Paulson,-s where the condition of a gift of
$15oo to be paid to the beneficiary in annual installments was his attendance at
the meetings of a certain church in which the testator was interested. The court
held that this condition was valid in spite of the rather broad language of the
Wisconsin constitutional guaranty.19 It would seem to follow that the guaranties
of religious freedom found in the various state constitutions are also directed
against the state governments' interference with the right of conscience rather
than against individual interference. The Pennsylvania case 20 which apparently
reached an opposite conclusion is in effect only dictum; the real basis for the
court's decision was that the condition failed as a condition subsequent because
it did not provide for any gift over in case of forfeiture. A later Pennsylvania
case, Devlin's Trust Estate,21 held a similar condition void as against public policy
without referring to the constitutional guaranties.
But even if a condition escapes constitutional restrictions, the more difficult
problem remains of determining whether it is contrary to public policy. In at-
tempting to reach a conclusion on this question, it is necessary to analyze the
Uz . S. CoxsT. Amend. I.
13. See, for example, S. C. CoNsT. art. I, § 4; VA. CoNST. art. I, § 16.
14. 275 Pa. 266, 270, 118 At. 9o7, gog (1922).
I. COOLEY, THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CoNsTiTUTIoNAL LAW (4th ed. 1931) 254, 259.
It has been held that the first amendment to the federal Constitution does not prevent state
governments from legislating against religious practices. Permoli v. New Orleans, 3 How.
589 (U. S. 1844).
16. COO=EY, CoNsTITuTIrOrAL LIzziTATIONS (8th ed. 1927) c. 13. See also the dissenting
opinion in Monongahela Navigation Co. v. Coons, 6 W. & S. IoI at lO7 (Pa. 1843).
17. Magee v. O'Neill, 19 S. C. 170, 187 (1882).
IS. 127 Wis. 612, 107 N. W. 484 (902).
1g. Wis. CONST. art. I, § i8.
20. Drace v. Klinedinst, 275 Pa. 266, 11S AtI. 9o7 (1922).
21. 284 Pa. II, 13o Atl. 238 (1925) ; see (1925) 74 U. OF PA. L. REV. 200.
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various types of religious conditions which usually appear in wills, Broadly
speaking, they fall into three classes. There are first the conditions which seek
to prevent the beneficiary from associating himself with a religious order (as the
priesthood) .2 2  Secondly, there are conditions which seek to restrict the bene-
ficiary to marriage within a certain religious denomination. 23 Thirdly come
those which directly attempt to restric the beneficiary in his religious choice, or,
if he is an infant, require that he be educated in a certain religious faith. 24 Since
each of these types present different problems it will be necessary to discuss them
separately.
The case of Barnum v. Mayor of Baltimore2 5 is illustrative of a bequest
conditioned upon the beneficiary's refraining from associating himself with the
Roman Catholic priesthood. The income of $65o,ooo was to go to the beneficiary
for life, with a gift over if he violated the condition. A few months after the
testator's death, the beneficiary became.a priest. The court held that he was
entitled to the income from the time of the testator's death to the time of his
entering the priesthood. In upholding the validity of the condition the court
expressly stated that it was not contrary to public policy. While such a condi-
tion does impose a certain amount of restraint on a beneficiary's, free exercise of
religious liberty by preventing him from following what he may believe is a
religious vocation, it is difficult to see how it can be regarded as such an absolute
interference with religious freedom as to be void as contrary to public policy.
The purpose of the testator in imposing the condition may be one of several.
He may be actuated by religious bigoti-y. On the other hand the condition may
be the result of a 'desire to insure that the property of the testator remain in the
family line-.a worthy intent which the law should and does protect. In the case
of Ex parte Dickson,26 the testator stated that his purpose in imposing the con-
dition was.of this nature. It is also quite possible that the testator is a devout
member of the particular religious faith~but may well believe that the best inter-
ests of both the beneficiary and the Church may be served by preventing the
beneficiary from becoming a member of a religious order of that faith. There
may also be the feeling that a person associating himself with a religious order
would have no use for property, being bounfd usually by a vow of poverty; con-
sequently, the restriction may be imposed, not as an absolute condition, but rather
as a limitation, the purpose being to insure the beneficiary a means of support
before he enters the religious order. An analogous case involving a restriction
on the income from a gift to the period during which the beneficiary remained
single was upheld in the case of Holbrook's Estate.27 The court, in answering
the argument that this was invalid as in total restraint of marriage, pointed out
22. Mitchell v. Mitchell, iS Md. 4o5 (1862) ; Barnum v. Mayor of Baltimore, 62 Md. 275
(1884) ; Ex parte Dickson, i Sim. (Ni. s.) 37 (Eng. Ch. i85o) ; Kenyon. v. See, 94 N. Y. 563
(884).
23. Hodgson v. Halford, 2i Ch. D. 959 (0879) ; It re Knox, L. R. 23 Ir. 542 (889);
Duggan v. Kelly, io Ir. Eq. R. 473 (848) ; Haughton v. Haughton, i Molloy 611 (Ir. Ch.
.1824) ; Renaud v. Lamothe, 32 Can. Sup. Ct. 357 (902).
24. Drace v. Klinedinst, 275 Pa. 266, 118 At. 9o7 (1922) ; Devlin's Trust Estate, 284
Pa. 11, 23o AtI. 238 (925); Magee v. O'Neill, 19 S. C. 170 (x882) ; In re Paulson, 127 Wis.
612, 2o7 N. W. 484 (902); Clavering v. Ellison, 7 H. L. Cas. 707 (1859) ; Borwick v. Bor-
wick [2933] i Ch. 657; Eggar v. May [2917] 2 Ch. 126; Maddox v. Maddox, ii Gratt. 8o4
(Va. 2854).
25. 62 Md. 275 (,884). In an earlier case in Maryland a similar condition that the bene-
ficiary withdraw from a convent with which she had associated herself was upheld. Mitchell
v. Mitchell, 28 Md. 405 (1862). The English case of Ex parte Dickson reached the same
conclusion in dealing with a like condition. I Sim. (N. s.) 37 (Eng. Ch. 185o).
26. 1 Sim. (N. s.) 37, 38 (Eng. Ch. 1850).
27. 213 Pa. 93, 62 At. 368 (I905).
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that the purpose of the testator may well have been to insure the support of the
beneficiary while she remained single, leaving her support after her marriage to
her husband. In both this type of case and the cases involving restrictions on
joining religious orders, the effect is to place a powerful restraint on the bene-
ficiary. But the law will not imply an improper motive to the testator in impos-
ing the condition, but will rather presume that the restriction is lawful.2 s In the
final analysis, such a condition does not impose any actual restraint upon religious
freedom. The beneficiary is perfectly free to practice any religion he thinks
best. There is no more reason for holding that such a condition is opposed to
public policy than there would be in so holding as to one that prevented the
beneficiary from entering some profession, a condition that would undoubtedly
be valid.
It already has been pointed out that conditions which are in total restraint
of marriage are generally held void as contrary to public policy.2 9 The basic
reason for this is that the law cannot perceive any proper motive for imposing a
condition which in effect prevents the exercise of a function which the state
believes is essential to its continued existence. While there are no cases directly
so holding, it is not difficult to suppose that a court would sustain the validity of
a condition which'was in absolute restraint of marriage when the testator stated
that his purpose in imposing the condition was the existence of a certain mental
or physical defect in the beneficiary which rendered him or her unfit for parent-
hood. In the case of conditions which seek to restrict the beneficiary in a choice
of a spouse to a certain religious sect, the testator in imposing the condition may
be actuated by one or more of a number of motives. Here also the condition
may be the result of religious bigotry, the purpose being to insure the beneficiary's
adherence to the faith of that sect. However, the motive of the testator in
imposing the condition may be to protect the beneficiary against the risk of an
unhappy marital life; an all too frequent result of mixed religious marriages. In
certain localities the members of different religious groups have different racial
origins. The desire of the testator to preserve the racial purity of his descendants
is not so unworthy as to be opposed to any sound public policy. Again, differ-
ences in religious beliefs may represent a difference in social status, resulting in
social disapproval of intermarriage. So important is the social value of marital
stability in the eyes of the law that any restrictions which tend to promote such
stability are viewed with favor by the law. It is interesting to note that cases
involving this type of condition have arisen frequently in Ireland,30 a country
where differences in religion typify a fundamental social conflict. In re Knox 3 '
is illustrative. After the court upheld the validity of a condition that he should
marry only a Protestant, the beneficiary, who had previously contracted a mar-
riage with a Catholic, sought to have the marriage declared invalid. It is not
unreasonable to suppose that religious differences, representing as they do in
Ireland a clash of social interests, contributed to the willingness of the beneficiary
28. Clausen v. Leary, 113 N. J. Eq. 324, 166 Atl. 623 (Ch. 1933) ; Holbrook's Estate, 213
Pa. 93, 62 Atl. 368 (I9O5).
29. See note io, supra.
30. In re Knox, L. R. 23 Ir. 542 (I889) ; Duggan v. Kelly, io Ir. Eq. R. 473 (2848);
Haughton v. Haughton, i Molloy 6ii (Ir. Ch. 1824).
3r. L. R. 23 Ir. 542 (I889). A Protestant father left certain property to his son on the
condition "that he does not commit adultery with any woman, and that if he should marry
that he will marry a Protestant wife, the daughter of Protestant parents who have always
been Protestants." Similar conditions were upheld in Hodgson v. Halford, ii Ch. D. 959
(1879), where a Jewish mother attempted to limit her children's marriages to members of the
Jewish faith, and in Renaud v. Lamothe, 32 Can. Sup. Ct. 357 (1902), where a Catholic
father attempted to compel his children to marry according to the rites of the Catholic
Church. In both cases there were strong social reasons for the restrictions imposed.
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to annul the marriage in order to secure the gift. Marriages based upon so
unstable a foundation may become an actual detriment to society. Any condition
which tends to discourage their formation is socially beneficial.
Where the condition restricting marriage to members of a particular religious
sect is so unreasonable as to be tantamount to a total restraint of marriage, it
has been held invalid. In Maddox v. Maddox,"2 a condition of a bequest was
that the beneficiary remain a member of the Society of Friends. One of the
requirements of this sect was that the members marry within the sect. The
beneficiary married a non-member and was expelled. The court, in holding that
the bequest passed free of the condition, pointed out that the condition in effect
limited the beneficiary to a choice between five men, and as such was an unreason-
able restraint on marriage.
While such conditions may indirectly impose some slight restraint on the
exercise of religious freedom, actually their effect is too remote to render them
invalid on this ground. This conclusion has been reached even in Pennsylvania,"3
a jurisdiction which is whole-heartedly committed to the doctrine that conditions
in restraint of religious liberty are void as contrary to piublic policy.
Cases of this type are often cited in support of the proposition that condi-
tions which restrain religious liberty are not void as, contrary to public policy.
As may be seen from the above discussion, they do not support so broad a state-
ment.
The validity of testamentary conditions which are aimed directly at prevent-
ing a free exercise of religious liberty depends on whether there exists a social
policy which supports the free practice of religious choice. An examination of
the constitutions of both the federal 34 and various state " governments furnishes
ample evidence that no other individual liberty has received such protection from
the interference of governmental authorities. While these guaranties (as has
been pointed out) actually operate only to protect the individual from the state's
interference, they represent a powerful recognition of the importance which the
social group attaches to such -liberty. In the United States religious liberty has
a peculiar value, since the colonization of this country was largely due to attempts
to escape from the terrors of religious persecution.
While the constitutional provisions do not formally prevent private interfer-
ence with liberty of conscience, they express in forceful terms a public policy in
favor of the safeguarding of that liberty. 6 If the state is forbidden to interfere
because of the peculiarly personal nature of the liberty, it would seem to follow
that there is all the more reason for believing that the individual should not be
allowed to utilize the legal machinery of the state so to interfere. In a more
civilized and more sophisticated society the use of the rack and the thumbscrew
to coerce religious conformance has become outmoded. But as the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania has forcefully pointed out, the power of testamentary
disposition may be a less drastic but more far-reaching weapon than physical
force. As was said in a leading case :--
"He [the testator] wished to force his lineal descendants to adhere to a
certain religious faith, under penalty of the loss of what might be termed
32. ii Gratt. 804 (Va. 1854).
33. Clayton's Estate, 13 Dist. & Co. Rep. 413 (Pa. 1930).
34. U. S. CONST. Amend. I.
35. COOLEY, op. cit. supra note 15, at 260.
36. "Other provisions of our law might be cited, all showing the studied purpose on the
part of our law givers to guard carefully the rights of conscience, and to hold them sacred
and inviolate." Maddox v. Maddox, ii Gratt. 804, 814 (Va. 1854).
37. Drace v. Klinedinst, 275 Pa. 266, 270, 118 Atl. 907, 909 (1922).
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their inheritance. Such penalty, of course, was in the nature of a punish-
ment, and, while not as severe, physically, as the stocks, pillory, the whipping
post, and other forms of physical chastisement, it would have a more lasting
effect, and would be likely to produce results. If we were to adopt appellant's
view, that such condition should be sustained, we would not only contravene
this announced policy, but we would, by that authority, originate the first
step to mark the entering wedge whereby, through successive encroachments,
the worship of God according to a given religious persuasion could be con-
trolled and compelled indefinitely through the disposition of property at
death. It would be a step backward, looking to the days of religious perse-
cution, and it is our duty to stop this effort in its inception."
Aside from the state's interest in the protection of religious freedom, the prac-
tical consequences of an enforced compliance with the testator's expressed intent
should be considered. If the beneficiary complies with a condition that, for
example, he attend church services regularly, the real intention of the testator
will scarcely be carried out. Enforced attendance at religious worship is con-
ducive neither to the honor of God nor to the spiritual benefit of the person who
is coerced into attendance. Further, the beneficiary in fulfilling the condition
could expect nothing but the scorn and contempt of his neighbors, who would
believe with reason that what should be a free act of devotion was being per-
formed for a mercenary purpose.
The majority of cases dealing with this type of condition are directed toward
securing the beneficiary's education in a certain religious faith, the beneficiary
being an infant. In dealing with such cases it is idle to speak of any infringe-
ment of religious liberty, since the child must take the religion which the parent
chooses for him.38  The leading case holding such conditions invalid, Devlin's
Trust Estate,"9 involved exceptional circumstances. While Catholic education for
the infant beneficiary was required by the condition, the child's mother bad, at
the time of her marriage, taken a pledge to rear her children as Roman Catholics.
In view of this solemn promise, the restraint on the mother's religious liberty was
considerably mitigated. As has been pointed out, to speak of any interference
with the child's freedom of religion is to blind oneself to the true situation.
However, a better basis exists for the invalidity of such a condition. It has been
held that any condition which tends to prevent the exercise of a parental duty
owed to the child is void as against public policy.4" In the case of Boreick v.
Borick,4 . the court clearly stated that the basis for holding such a condition void
was that it prevented the parent from fulfilling one of his most important duties
to a child-education in the religious faith which the parent believes the true
faith.42  To place a parent in a situation in which he is compelled to choose
between sacrificing his child's material interests or his spiritual welfare is to
place an intolerable burden upon a parent. Regardless of how he acts there is a
danger of alienating his child. If he forfeits the gift, he may feel that his child
on reaching majority will resent the loss of his inheritance. If he complies with
the condition, the education of his child in an alien faith is certain to destroy one
of the deepest bonds which exists between parent and child.
38. For a striking judicial recognition of this fact see Eggar v. May [1917] 2 Ch. 126.
39. 284 Pa. ii, i3O Atl. 238 (1925).
40. ln re Forte's Will, I49 MNisc. 327, 267 N. Y. Supp. 603 (1933).
41. [1933] 1 Ch. 657.
42. In 1882 the Circuit Court of South Carolina intimated that this was the correct basis
for invalidating such conditions. The Circuit Court's decree (which was reversed on appeal)
is set out in full in the upper court's opinion. Magee v. O'Neill, ig S. C. 170, 174 (1882).
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With the increase in religious tolerance coupled with a decline in the dog-
matic certainty that one's own religion is so irrefutably the only true religion that
there exists a duty to impose it upon whomever one can, the occurrence of this
last type of condition in testamentary dispositions has declined. Nevertheless, it
would seem that there exists a strong public policy for striking them down when
they do appear as threats to a free exercise of religious worship. They serve no
purpose. They neither effect the real intention of the testator, since at best they
only secure a nominal compliance with his wishes, nor do they serve any interest
of the state, since it stands to lose rather than gain by a hypocritical religious
practice. And, in a final analysis, by promoting religious hypocrisy, they are
destructive of any true system of worship.
J.E.B.
